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Marketable Title on a Place in Space
D. OBvnmL L=
Space, it's wonderful! This modification of an oft-repeated
clichM is intended in no way to dimnish the significance of
mankind's yearning for peace since the beginning of time.
It is, however, designed to focus attention on the conquest of
space, mankind's twentieth-century contribution to what has
come to be known as "progress". Contemporary writers
characterize the era in which we live as the "space age"
and there is every reason to believe that historians of the
future will similarly record the twentieth century as -the epoch
of man's mastery not only of transportation in space, but
also of his dominion over space.
The early decades of our era initiated the "space age".
From the Wright brothers' early experiments with propelled
transportation in space above a North Carolina beach, to the
mid-century worldwide jet-propelled aircraft of today, the
conquest of travel through inner space has been successfully
concluded for all practical purposes. The frontiers of outer
space, however, have presented the new mid-century chal-
lenge. From the aeronauts of inner space to the astronauts of
outer space, mankind's answer to the new challenge has
been sputniks, space capsules and telstars in orbit. Just
over the scientific horizon and currently thought to be within
man's accomplishments are "space platforms" and visits to
the planets of -the universe. "Destination-the Moon" is the
present-day clamor of science, and the major nations of the
world are engaged in a costly scientific race to be the first
to reach that destination.
In the midst of all this scientific conquest of space, what
is the status of space in the context of property law? Is
space property, and if so, what is the mid-twentieth-century
concept of property ownership in space? In the two-dimen-
sional sense, space is usually considered as an unoccupied
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area set apart or available for a particular purpose. This is
the plane concept, as distinguished from the cubical concept
of three-dimensional space. The modern -legal concept of real
property must necessarily apply -to three-dimensional areas
or objects withn the limitations of shaped volume defined by
architectural forms; yet, the three-dimensional concept of
space may be considered as an entity that extends without
bounds in all directions. Ownership of real property in space
without boundaries? Impossible-perhaps so, but is it truly
impossible? What has been the law, and what is the "space
age" law, on property ownership in space? If one considers
"space" to be an unoccupied cubic intangible, a concept of
nothingness that is everywhere about us, the subject of our
consideration narrows down by a quaint syllogism to an
examination of the law about nothing! Charles Dickens had
the answer to that: "If the law supposes that," said Mr.
Bumble, "the law.., is a(n) idiot; ... and the worst I wish
the law is, that his eye may be opened by experience." Oliver
Twist, Chap. 51. The reader is entitled to his own conclusions
about the idiotic aspects of this inquiry, but let us now open
the eye to experience, to the background of property owner-
ship of space.
Lord Coke undertook to set forth the earliest known con-
cept of property ownership in space. In Book II of his First
Institute of the Laws of England dealing with tenures and
real property, Coke wrote: "And lastly, the earth hath in
law a great extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been
said, but of air and all other things even up to heaven; for
cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos." Co.
Litt. 4a. Coke's exposition of this concept came to be known
in the law as the ad coelum and the ad inferos doctrines, and
Blackstone later commented: "And therefore no man may
erect any building or the like, to overhang another's land;
and downwards whatever is in a direct line between the sur-
face of any land and the centre of the earth, such as mines
of metal and other profits, belongs to the owner of the surface.
So that the word 'land' includes not only the face of the earth,
but everything under it, or over it." 2 B1. Com. 18. With this
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pronouncement, Blackstone established the theory of vertical
ownership applicable to real property in the Anglo-American
law, a theory that can be paraphrased by the statement that
common law land ownership carried with it ownership from
the center of the earth to the heavens (through space) above,
measured perpendicular to the surface on any particular tract
of land. Blackstone's influence on the development of the
common law is well-recognized by legal historians, and Vir-
ginia was the one American colony in which occurred the
earliest and most complete reception of the common law as
moulded by Blackstone. See 1 Powell on Real Property 102-
116.
Since ownership of land at common law, according to the
ad coelum and ad inferos maxims, included corporeal owner-
ship of both the space above and the earth beneath, trespass
for the invasion of (the space above and the subsurface below)
one's property was properly actionable in tort. Similarly, the
common law applicable to certain easements and profits was
founded on these antiquated aphorisms, and has so continued
to the present day. The earliest judicial application of the
ad coelum doctrine appears in Bury v. Pope, Cr. F liz. 1582-
1603, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (circa 1586) and was there applied
to an overhanging roof, an encroachment on the plaintiff's
property ownership of the space above his land. More than
two centuries later Lord Ellenborough gazed into his judicial
crystal ball and wrote: "Nay, if this board overhanging the
plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow that an aero-
naut is liable in an action for trespass quare cdausum fregit
at the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon
passes on the course of his voyage." Pickering v. Rudd,
4 Camp. 219, 220-221, 171 Eng. Rep. 70, 71 (1815). Although
no contemporary accused Lord Ellenborough of talking
through his balloon, it is obvious that he had anticipated the
weakness of the ad coelum doctrine far ahead of his time.
The "space age" of today, confirming Lord Ellenborough's
augury, has required some extensive modifications of the old
ad coelmm doctrine by way of fixing altitudinal limitations on
the extent of real property rights in space, limitations that
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were essential if space was destined, as it was and is, to be-
come the new thoroughfare for the world's public transporta-
tion. So far in the law of the "space age" it has been estab-
lished that not only is outer space in the public domain, bu
also that the upper portion of imner space is similarly a public
thoroughfare. Here, then, there has developed coincident witl
the amputation of the upper portion of inner space from real
property rights in the land below, a new concept of horizontal
property rights, rights in -space which extend upward fron
the earth's surface to a horizontal plane parallel thereto, E
concept which bobtails the upper extremities of property
rights in space, shearing off the endless and topmost fringe
of the ad coelum principle. This new approach by way ol
horizontal layers of space has developed during the first hall
of the current century, first by judicial decision in the so-callef
"airport cases," and more recently by legislative enactment
Modern altitudinal limitations of private property rightE
in space have been founded on one or more of several theories
The first such theory attempted to preserve the ad coelun,
concept of absolute space ownership by the subjacent land.
owner, but made such ownership subject to a permanent
flight easement for the benefit of the public. This approaci
sought to preserve the traditional vertical property concepl
and was incorporated into the Uniform Aeronautics Acd
which by 1943 had been adopted by twenty-two states. 11
U.L.A. 157-167. It also enjoyed the full support of the Ameri.
can Law Institute. Restatement Torts, § 194 (1934). However
while this theory was gaining legislative and judicial favoi
in a number of states, a judicial pronouncement undertool
for the first time to draw a horizontal property boundar 3
line in space within the limitations of actual use of the space
(as distinguished from potential use) by the subjacent land
owner. This "actual use" theory was founded on actua'
dominion over certain space above the surface, and obviousl.
established just above that strata an upper space stratz
that not only disregarded but also destroyed future potentia.
ownership and use by extension upward from the appropri.
ated space below. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. 2c
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755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied 300 U. S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431
(1937). In its opinion, the court struck a fatal blow at the
ad coelum doctrine. "We reject that doctrine," the court
said, and continued: "We think it is not the law and that it
never was the law." Then attempting to rationalize its vicious
assault on the ancient maxim, the court concluded: "When it
is said that man owns, or may own, to the heavens, that
merely means that no one can acquire a right in space above
him that will limit him in whatever use he can make of it as a
part of his enjoyment of the land. To this extent his title
to the air is paramount. No other person can acquire any
title or exclusive right to any space above him."
The complete and final demise of the ad coelum doctrine,
along with both previous theories which had hastened its
dissolution, can be said to have taken place as 'a result of the
controlling opinion in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946). The Causby case has been the subject
of much learned writing in the law and there is no need to
present here a further critique. It is enough merely to suggest
that the Causby case introduced the third and now the pre-
vailing theory: That rights in land extend upward into space
to an elevation within which the subjacent owner has poten-
tiaZ use and enjoyment, which elevation extends no -higher into
space than the minimum safe altitude of flight as propounded
in the interests of safety in aerial navigation as well as safety
in the use of the private property below. Thus, as recently as
1946, there has been drawn an imaginary horizontal property
boundary line, establishing with some finality an upper bound-
ary to private property rights in space. However, in the entire
development of the prevailing current law applicable to space
navigation, the emphasis has been on use and enjoyment of
space in terms of rights incident to subjacent property rather
than on absolute ownership of space itself on a horizontal
property base.
With its roots deep in the English common law of Black-
stone, the jurisprudence of Virginia maintained a firm grasp
on both the ad coelmn and ad inferos doctrines. Indeed, even
in the early years of the twentieth century, President Judge
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Keith wrote: "In legal contemplation it may be that any
unauthorized entry upon the premises of another whose title
extends to the centre of the earth, downward, and without
limit upward, by putting one's hand through or over a
boundary fence, is a trespass." Lynchburg Telephone Co. v.
Booker, 103 Va. 595 608, 50 S.E. 148 152 (1905). That the
grasp might have been slipping is evidenced by the learned
court's use of the phrase "it may be," indicating some doubt
as to the exact status of the Virginia space law at that
time.
The development of horizontal property ownership down-
ward into the earth's subsurface, in conflict with the ad
inferos doctrine, far antedates the evolution of horizontal
property in space. Mankind's efforts to extract and make
beneficial use of the minerals of the earth was the stimulus
for the progressive malady which infected this maxim of the
common law and ultimately brought about its legal obituary
in most jurisdictions. Under the early feudal system of Eng-
land, mines of gold and silver were the exclusive property of
the crown and by virtue of the royal prerogative did not pass
by a grant of private property to a lord. Subsequent English
legislative enactments in the seventeenth century undertook
to establish private property ownership in subsurface min-
erals other than gold and silver, and where private land
contained no gold or silver at all the English courts held that
all other minerals in place (unsevered) belonged to the sur-
face owner. Case of Mines, 1 Plowd. 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 472
(1550-1580); Atty-Gen. v. Morgan, 1 Ch. 432 (1891). It there-
fore followed that minerals unsevered from the soil were
held to be -separate corporeal hereditaments, were property
interests capable of possession distinct from the surface,
and could be made the subject of fee simple title separate
from the surface ownership. Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 402,
127 Eng. Rep. 889 (1808). This concept of fee simple owner-
ship of minerals in place as separated from the absolute
estate in the superjacent land surface should not be confused
with a mineral lease in an estate of less than a freehold
where the tenant's possessory rights are established without
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impeachment for waste, nor should it be confused with the
grant of a profit a! prendre in the subsurface minerals which
creates in the grantee an incorporeal, rather than a corporeal,
estate. It would seem, however, that the incorporeal aspect
of the profit a, prendre has had a substantial influence in Vir-
ginia in defeating the concept of a corporeal fee simple in
subsurface minerals on a foundation of horizontal property
ownership. The method of conveyance by which the subsurface
mineral interests were separately created, coupled with sub-
sequent severance of the minerals from the -soil and their
transformation from real property into personal property,
probably promoted the conflicting views that ultimately de-
veloped.
At early English common law, the requirement of livery of
seisin (feoffment) was inconsistent with the creation of a fee
simple in subsurface minerals as a separate estate because it
was physically impossible to place a feofee of such minerals
in actual possession. Hence a conveyance of the subsurface
minerals could only be accomplished by express grant similar
to the creation of a profit. Therefore, where created by grant,
problems of construction were built into the documentary
conveyance with the result -that some courts construed the
grantee's interest thus created as an incorporeal profit, other
courts as a corporeal estate in the -subsurface in the form of
fee simple horizontal property. Although it was well-settled
that the severance of the minerals from the soil transformed
them from real into personal property, a construction of a
prior fee simple ownership of the minerals in place created
new problems of construction as to ownership of the space-
the remaining hole-from which the minerals had been ex-
tracted. When the minerals were withdrawn, there remained
a place in subsurface space-the hole-the cubic content of
which was easily determinable because the boundaries of the
resulting space (the walls, floors and ceilings of the mine)
were still there. Where there was previously a horizontal
property fee simple in the minerals, it would seem to follow
that the same fee simple ownership of the subsurface space
should continue after the extraction, the sdme as before;
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where there was only a profit a' prendre in the minerals, it
was clear that the superjacent surface owner held the unen-
cumbered fee simple in the hole after the extraction.
In a vast majority of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
tury American cases, the courts had no difficulty in distin-
guishing a mineral grant in fee simple from the grant of a
profit a' prendre, thus establishing a concept of fee simple
ownership in subsurface horizontal property and thereby
eradicating the last vestiges of the ancient ad inferos maxim
from the jurisprudence of many states. "There may be sever-
ance of the estate in surface from the estate in subsurface,"
said a federal appellate court in a leading case from Illinois.
"The authorities seem to recognize the right of severance to
extend to as many strata as there may be in the subsurface."
Shell Oil Co. v. Manley Oil Corp., 124 F. 2d 714, 715 (1942).
This opinion not only reversed the U. S. District Court below
(37 F. Supp. 289) which had subscribed to the old ad inferos
doctrine, but also by its reference to "strata" in the sub-
surface seemed to clearly support the concept of horizontal
property ownership. The earliest Virginia case recognizing
separate estates in the surface and subsurface was Lee v.
Bwmgardner, 86 Va. 315, 10 S.E. 3 (1889). There followed a
series of cases apparently in accord, but none clearly dis-
tinguished between fee simple ownership of minerals in place,
and ownership of the place containing the minerals. Va. Coal
and Iron Co. v. Kelly, 93 Va. 332, 24 S.E. 1020 (1896); Inter-
state Co. v. Clintwood, 105 Va. 574, 54 S.E 593 (1905); Mori-
son v. American Assn., 110 Va. 91, 65 S.E. 469 (1909); and
Va. Coal and Iron Co. v. Hylton, 115 Va. 418, 79 S.E. 337
(1913). Of more recent origin, in the construction of a deed
which severed the subsurface mineral interests from the sur-
face, Justice Hudgins commented that "the relation of the
parties as owners of the mineral rights is not that of co-
terminous landowners". Buchanan Coal Co. v. Street, 175
Va. 531, 540; 9 S.E. 2d 339, 343 (1940). If this distinguished
jurist used the term "coterminous" as meaning coextensive
in the context of common property boundary lines in the sub-
surface, as seems probable, it would indicate that Virginia
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law clings to the old ad inferos doctrine to the extent -that a
fee simple mineral grant is not such -at all, but in substance
is the equivalent of a mere profit a' prendre, an incorporeal
hereditament. This strange application of legal magic may
have had its origin in an earlier case which thrust the Vir-
ginia law off on a curiously oblique tangent.
Whereas the trend of modern law in England and most
American states pointed toward the construction that an
unqualified grant or reservation of subsurface minerals oper-
ated to sever the ownership horizontally, none of the Virginia
cases had, as previously suggested, clearly reached that con-
clusion. In England and most other jurisdictions where the
issue arose, it was frequently held that the subsurface min-
eral owner continued to own, and was entitled to use, the
subterranean space created by the extraction of the minerals
which were the essence of the original grant. Annot. 15 A.L.R.
946. However, a conclusion just the opposite was reached by
a divided court in the curious Virginia case of Clayborn v.
Camilla Red Ask Coal Co., 128 Va. 383, 105 S. E. 117, 15
A.L.R. 946 (1920). In the majority opinion of this case,
Justice Kelly drew an analogy between separate fee simple
ownership in subsurface minerals and fee simple ownership
of standing timber on the land surface in superjacent space,
holding both, while in an unsevered state, to be corporeal
property interests, but after severance, concluding -that they
were incorporeal interests (in the form of profits a' prendre)
ab initio from the time of the grant! This legal magic might
have been performed with greater judicial finesse had the
court exercised its powers of legal prestidigitation in the
finest tradition of the law of future interests. Assuming that
the surface owners were the successors in interest of the
original grantor of the subsurface, the court might have
transformed the absolute fee in the subsurface into a de-
terminable fee simple so long as the minerals remained un-
severed; the resulting possibility of reverter, not subject
to the rule against perpetuities, would then have matured into
a present estate in the surface owners on removal of the
minerals and the "hocus-pocus" of corporeal and incorporeal
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estates could have been avoided. The dissenting opinion of
Justice Prentis pointed with approval to the opposite and
widely prevailing doctrine which the majority had extin-
guished in Virginia, a doctrine of horizontal property owner-
ship in the subsurface, -and found no sound reason to upset
its application in Virginia as a rule of property law. Never-
theless, the controlling opinion firmly rejected that rule, a
rejection which undoubtedly still prevails. Whereas in almost
all states, the fee simple owner of the subsurface minerals
continues to own the space-the hole-after the minerals are
extracted, in Virginia there can be no marketable title on a
place in subsurface space-in the hole-in horizontal prop-
erty below the surface after the minerals have been removed.
Therefore, it would seem that Virginia law does not today
recognize horizontal subsurface property ownership as sepa-
rate and distinct from title in the surface of the land above.
With the ad coelum doctrine succinctly modified in the
modern law of space navigation, and with the ad inferos
doctrine practically obsolete in the jurisprudence of sub-
surface horizontal property ownership everywhere but in
Virginia, it becomes necessary to next explore the influence
and demise of the former maxim within the context of space
habitation. It is an elementary principle of real property
law that fee simple ownership of 'land carries with it the right
to either present or ultimate possession and use of the land
surface. Unlike the living creatures of the soil (e.g. the
earthworm), mankind's very existence from the beginning of
time has been as a user and occupier of space immediately
above the surface of the earth. Therefore, it naturally followed
that one who owned a -tract of land had the right to habitate
the space above that land; indeed, such use and occupancy is
essential to life itself. However, mere fee simple title to the
land surface was never considered to be the sole prerequisite
to the use and occupancy of the space above. It therefore
followed that the right to possession of space above the sur-
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face could be entirely separate and distinct from the fee
simple ownership of the land beneath the space. Let us con-
sider several factual illustrations.
Where an owner of land makes an excavation thereon and
piles the removed earth on the surface of his land alongside,
he is creating space in the form of a surface excavation (a
hole) and he is at the same time taking physical possession
of the space where the removed earth is amassed. Obviously,
said owner continues to own the pile of dirt that was (prior
to the excavation) a place in space, and it similarly follows
that he continues to own, and has the right to use and occupy,
the newly created space-the surface hole. Here there is no
problem as to the boundaries of ownership. However, let us
suppose that the same property ownership consists of a
two-family duplex dwelling with an apartment on the second
floor, or a modern high-rise apartment building, where the
(or an) upper-story apartment is leased to a tenant. Does
the lease convey only an estate in the physical floors, walls
and ceilings of the apartment, or does the possessory right
conveyed to the tenant include a leasehold estate in the space
thereby enclosed? If the former, it is reasonable to conclude
that the lease of the physical boundaries also creates in the
tenant by implication only an easement to use and occupy
the space contained within these boundaries, and not an
estate in the space; if the latter, the suggestion is obvious:
The landlord owned not only the boundaries of the upper
apartment but also the enclosed space within those boundaries,
and conveyed an estate of horizontal property of less than a
freehold in space, to the tenant. From the latter concept, it
follows that the floors, walls and ceilings are merely the
boundaries of the landlord's freehold estate in space, the
possessory rights to which have been conveyed to the tenant
by the lease. If the concept of horizontal property ownership
could be established by inference from the latter proposition
applicable -to a leasehold estate, the premise of space owner-
ship on a horizontal base would easily follow, founded on the
theory that a right to present or future possession of a
horizontal layer of space is equivalent to absolute ownership
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thereof. Unfortunately, however, the American case law sup-
ports the former theory, and not the latter.
Where there is a lease for a term of years, it has been gen-
erally held at common law that the destruction of the building
terminates the lease. In other words, where the boundaries
of the leased premises in space (the building) are destroyed,
the tenant's leasehold estate has evaporated. McMillan v.
Soloman, 42 Ala. 356 (1868); cf. Gainer v. Griffith, 76 W. Va.
426, 85 S.E. 713 (1915). Furthermore, it has been held that
where leased premises remained in possession of the tenant
after the building containing the premises was moved to
a new tract of land, the tenant's estate in the structure
continued at the new location for the term of the lease. Here
the tenant's right to the use and occupancy of the space
originally enclosed by the building has been lost; his estate
included only the structural boundaries (the building) with an
implied easement for use of the space therein, and with the
leased building's boundaries moved to a new location, the
easement in space at the first location has vanished and has
been replaced by an implied easement in space at the new
location. Leiferma v. Osten, 167 Ill. 93, 47 N.D. 203 (1897).
This obviously supports the former theory and defeats any
concept of a horizontal property leasehold, a horizontal
estate of less than a freehold, in space.
The next step in this analysis is the application of the two
possible theories to the conveyance of a freehold estate in
space. Where an upper portion of a building is conveyed
separately from the land and its under-structure beneath, by
application of the former theory there is created only a free-
hold estate in the walls, floors and ceilings with which there
is an implied easement in the freeholder to use and enjoy
the space thereby enclosed. It is clear from this construction
that the ad coelum doctrine is present, that the lower free-
holder's ownership in space extends upward "to the heavens,"
and that the conveyance of the upper boundaries in space
has created only an encumbrance on that space ownership
in the form of an easement. However, by application of the
latter theory, there has been created by the conveyance a
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freehold estate in space by which the walls establish the
vertical boundaries, and the floors and ceilings the horizontal
boundaries. Therefore, only by means of this second theory
can there be established by a conveyance in fee simple of an
upper portion of a building, a marketable title on a place in
space. Are there any precedents in the law by which applica-
tion of this latter theory may be sustained?
Many current scholars of real property law allege that
horizontal property ownership-a freehold estate in space-
has its origin in the Roman law, that it developed in the
Civil Law of continental Europe, and that in recent times the
Spanish heritage of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has
brought it to the Western Hemisphere where it has acquired
the newly-adopted designation of "condominium". The de-
rivation of the condominium from the Roman law, however,
is open to question, for it appears that the Roman law per-
mitted no ownership in limited stratum of soil or airspace, and
allowed only the landowner's full dominion or ownership in
space to be encumbered by certain rights less than ownership.
Hazeltine, Law of the Air (1911) 74-75. Moreover, in Ger-
many, where the influence of the Roman law was not always
predominant, horizontal property ownership seems to have
been established as early as the twelfth century. Huebner,
History of Germanic Private Law (Cont. Leg. Hist. Series,
1918), 174. Later, the enabling act of the German Civil Code
expressly recognized improved horizontal property -as subject
to private ownership, and the influence of the Germanic,
rather -than the Roman law carried over to Switzerland. Ger-
man Civil Code (1900) 128; Swiss Civil Code (1907) 675.2.
While the early French law codified the ad coelum doctrine,
it also incorporated a rebuttable presumption implying the
possibility of horizontal property ownership in buildings.
French Civil Code (1803), arts. 552, 553, 664.
The earliest indication of a freehold estate in space in the
English case law seems to definitely discredit the concept of
horizontal property ownership. There is reference to a case
in the Year Books where, "in answer to a suggestion that a
man may have a franktenement (a freehold) in an upper
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chamber, it was said that such could not be, for it could not
continue, since, if the foundation failed, the chamber would
be gone." Y. B. Brooke 5 Hen. 8, f. 213, pl. 20 (1586). A
change, curiously enough, later came about because of a cus-
tom of the English legal profession whereby its members
shared the privileges and fellowship of the Inns of Court.
Originally, chambers of the Inner and Middle Temples were
leased by the members of the profession; but during the
reign of Elizabeth I, new and additional chambers became
necessary and the Inns themselves were unable to finance the
expansion. An individual member of the Temple then under-
took to finance and build his own chamber on the Temple's
site and the arrangement was made that he would hold the
chamber for life and that he could assign or leave it by will
to any fellow or fellows who would -hold it similarly. This
arrangement, comparable to a freehold estate for life coupled
with a special power to appoint a similar estate by deed or
will, found great favor among the English legal profession
and many such arrangements, supplanting the former lease,
are found in the records of the Middle Temple. Williamson,
The History of the Temple (1924), 227 228, 234-236, 291-292.
Therefore, it was not unusual that Lord Coke would observe
in the early seventeenth century that "a man may have an
inheritance in an upper chamber, -though the lower buildings
and soile be in another, and seeing it is an inheritance cor-
porealt it shall passe by livery." Co. Litt. 42b. Coke had
unquestionably announced that there was an estate of in-
heritance in horizontal property of an upper legal chamber.
It was inevitable that this concept would spread among the
laity of England, and in a leading English case of 1787, the
court remarked: "We know that in London different persons
have several freeholds over the same spot ... That is the
,case in the Inns of Court." Freeland v. Burt, 1 T.R. 701,
99 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1787).
As in England, the American common law has given cre-
dence to the concept of freehold estates in improved horizontal
real property. An early Iowa case introduced the concept by
holding that a homestead exemption statute operated to
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separate real property ownership in horizontal layers. In
that case the soil plus the second and third stories of a build-
ing were exempt as a homestead, but the first floor and base-
ment not within the exemption were separately alienable.
Rhodes, Pegram and Co. v. McCormick, 4 Iowa (Cole's) 368
(1857). A much later case from a neighboring mid-western
state held that "a house, or even the upper chamber of a
house, may be held separately from the soil on which it
stands, and an action of ejectment will lie to recover it."
Madison v. Madison, 206 Ill. 534, 537, 69 N.]. 625, 627 (1903).
Indeed, several years earlier, another mid-western state had
sustained separate freehold ownership of a third story in the
attachment of a contractor's lien. Badger Lumber Co. v.
Stepp, 157 Mo. 366, 57 S.W. 1059 (1900). However, both
contrary and confirming judicial pronouncements were made
in the American common law to the middle of the twentieth
century, with the result that the concept of freehold estates
in space was quite unsettled, and the marketability of title to
such freehold estates extremely doubtful.
The twentieth century "space age" in the United States
essentially is an urban civilization. No longer is it practical
or feasible to "keep 'em down on the farm." Mechanized
farming coupled with the automated industrial revolution
have brought young and old to the cities of America with
the result that urban housing has become a major problem
for the average community. The cities of the United States,
not unlike the island Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
isles of our fiftieth state of Hawaii, are limited in land area
and in most cases where geographic annexation of surround-
ing territory is not possible, the only solution to the housing
problem lies in the residential use of space. As a result, both
"high-rise" and "low-rise" apartment structures have be-
come more and more significant in the effort to fulfill the de-
mand for urban residential housing. However, because of the
unsettled common law of horizontal property in space, until
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comparatively recent times such housing units in the apart-
ment-type structure were available only to lessees. The work-
ing or retired urban dweller who preferred to own his own
home was driven to the city suburbs and adjacent areas
outside and away from the urban centers, where he was (and
presently continues) to be plagued every moment of his
daily life by inadequate fire and police protection, and sub-
jected to traffic and transportation monstrosities seemingly
without hope of abatement. Private home ownership, one of
the major fundamentals of a free society, has slowly and
steadily become less probable and less possible within the
boundaries of our cities.
The earliest and most successful attempt to solve the prob-
lem of urban home ownership disregarded entirely the poten-
tials already available within the legal concept of horizontal
property ownership in space. Instead, almost forty years ago,
the first solution took the form of the "co-operative apart-
ment," a legal hybrid which still continues in wide use. Its
most popular form has been the "stock-lease co-operative"
where title to the land and buildings is held by ,a corporation,
and each stockholder of that corporation is entitled to oc-
cupy a particular unit or apartment within -the project,
usually under a long-term lease. The corporation's by-laws,
and also each lease, provide for a sharing of the common
expenses by the stockholder-lessee and upon the tenant's
failure to pay his allocated share of these expenses (which
include the taxes) he may be dispossessed, his lease termi-
nated, and his stock in the corporation cancelled. Under this
arrangement, the apartment-occupier is both a stockholder
and a lessee, but is not a property owner of space. His own
unit cannot be separately mortgaged, and in the event of
foreclosure of the mortgage on the entire project (land and
building) he may lose everything. Therefore, it is obvious
that in a "stock-lease co-operative," the owning corporation
stands between the stockholder-lessees and title to the land
and building. Furthermore, present corporation laws along
with modern property law of landlord and tenant have been
completely adequate for the "stock-lease co-operative" and
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no new statutes have ever been needed or enacted. It is
interesting to observe that there are more than five thousand
"stock-lease co-operative" apartment buildings in the state
of Florida alone, and that this type of housing is on the in-
crease in many cities of our country located in states where no
horizontal property statute has been enacted.
Another type, known as the "co-ownership co-operative"
has been much -less frequently used and needed no new statu-
tory law to exist. This type of co-operative arises where each
so-called "buyer" of an individual unit is conveyed an un-
divided fractional interest in the entire land and building
and becomes a tenant in common of the entire project. The
deed of such a "buyer," however, excludes the right to possess
and occupy any of the property except the one designated
unit and by -the same deed there is granted the right to use
the common areas of the project along with all of the other
co-owners. The obligations to share the cost of maintenance,
repairs, taxes, mortgage loan payments, etc. of the entire
project are incurred by means of covenants in the separate
apartment deeds, which covenants purport to bind the
grantee's successors and assigns and contain conditions for
reversion of title on failure to perform the covenants. It is
obvious that such "co-ownership co-operatives" introduce
numerous legal problems of concurrent ownership, of cove-
nants running with the land, and of future interests by way
of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition
broken. Indeed, there are so many legal problems involved
in this type of co-operative that individual owners of such
units have found it impossible to secure a mortgage loan on
an individual unit or apartment.
Therefore, neither -the "stock-lease co-operative" nor the
''co-ownership co-operative"l provides a satisfactory solution
to the problem of home ownership in our heavily populated
urban areas. What, then, has been the most recent effort to
find a solution? The solution seems to -have been found in
the "condominium' '-the newest concept of horizontal owner-
ship in space-a concept that must necessarily have its origin
in a statutory horizontal property law because of the unsettled
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state of the Anglo-American common law. Although the two
existing types of co-operatives are both dependent upon the
common law of real property and the corporation statutes
of the various states, the condominum rests entirely on
statute and has been sometimes referred to as a "statutory
co-operative." The label of a "co-operative" is only partially
descriptive and would seem to apply only to the common
elements of such a project.
The first such statute within the American domain was the
Horizontal Property Act of Puerto Rico. P. R. Laws Ann.
tit. 31, §§ 1291-93 (Supp. 1959.) Although the current Puerto
Rico act did not become law until 1958, certain portions of
that law were enacted as far back as 1902. However, it was
not until 1955 that Puerto Rican builders first began to
construct condominium projects and since then they have
multiplied extensively and have been in great demand by
the citizens of Puerto Rico. With a limited land area, the
island Commonwealth is faced with the same general prob-
lems of adequate housing that are present in the urban cen-
ters of the American mainland. As in Puerto Rico, the islands
of our newest and fiftieth state of Hawaii comprise a limited
land area along with an ever-increasing concentration of
population in need of adequate housing, and the construction
of condominium projects was given statutory encouragement
there by enactment of its Horizontal Property Act in 1961.
Act 180, Session Laws of Hawaii (1961).
The development of the condominium not only in Puerto
Rico and Hawaii but also on the American mainland was
given a newly-added incentive by the 1961 Amendment to the
National Housing Act which in Section 104 authorizes the
Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages on
individual condominium apartments. 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715y(a) (Supp. III 1959-61). This new section of the Na-
tional Housing Act has presented a solution to the problem
of financing individual condominium units, a major problem
that had impeded the sale of condominium apartments in
Puerto Rico for a number of years. Its essential purpose was
to increase the supply of privately owned dwelling units
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"where, under the laws of the state in which the property is
located, real property title and ownership are established
with respect to a one-family unit which is part of a multi-
family structure." The reference to the establishment of
"real property title and ownership" clearly indicates a
marketable title on a unit that is "part of a multifamily
structure" and was obviously intended to include upper
chambers in such structures-places in space. Inspired by
this federal financing medium, the first Horizontal Property
Act in a mainland state became Arkansas law in 1961, fol-
lowed closely by comparable acts in Kentucky and Virginia
in 1962. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-1001-23 (Supp. 1961); Ky Rev.
Stat. §§ 381.805-.910 (1962); Code of Va. (1950), §§ 55-79.1-
79.33 (Supp. 1962). In the very near future it is anticipated
that statutes purporting to establish marketable title in hori-
zontal property units in space will be universal throughout
the country. However, there has been so far no absolute uni-
formity in this legislation with the result that the intent to
establish marketable title on a place in space may fall short
of accomplishment in many state jurisdictions. The Virginia
act, since codified as Chapter 4.1 of the Code of Virginia,
1950, is one such effort that seems to have missed its intended
objective: to establish a marketable title on a place in space.
In Virginia, each individual unit of a condominium is de-
fined by the Act as an "apartment" and the definition of an
"apartment" is broad enough to include residential, office,
commercial and industrial use. The units or "apartments"
so defined may be contained in buildings of one or more
stories, the only specific requirement being that each unit
or "apartment" shall have a direct exit to either a thorough-
fare, or to a common space leading to a thoroughfare. The
entire condominium project is created by the developer or
owner(s) of the project through the recording of a master
deed-and once so recorded, the Virginia condominium be-
comes what, the Act defines as a "horizontal property re-
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gime". Unlike the comparable statute of Hawaii which re-
quires a minimum of six units for a condominium project,
the Virginia Act reduces the minimum number to four, which
would indicate that a four-family structure can be erected
as a condominium project and ripen into a horizontal prop-
erty regime by the recording of the master deed. Thus it
would seem that there can be no title to a place in Virginia's
space unless said space is sub-divided at least into four
specific horizontal as well as vertical boundaries.
It is provided that each individual unit or "apartment"
of a Virginia horizontal property regime may be separately
conveyed or encumbered, and in addition to this separate
alienability each unit is made separately devisable and de-
scendable. Furthermore, all documents involving titles in fee
simple, titles of less than a fee simple with future interests,
deeds of trust, liens, etc. are made separately recordable for
each unit. The common areas of the horizontal property re-
gime (the land, foundations, main walls, stairways, halls,
lobbys, elevators, utility services, etc.) are defined as the
"general common elements," in all of which the individual
owner of a unit becomes a tenant in common, referred to as
a "co-owner,"I along with all of the other individual apart-
ment co-owners. The fractional share of the co-ownership in
these "general common elements" is established through
governing by-laws adopted by a "council of co-owners," the
latter comprising all of the individual unit or apartment
owners of the regime. In addition to its function in the
adoption of by-laws which govern the administration of that
portion of the regime comprising the "common elements",
this "council" is given discretionary power to appoint an
administrator, or establish a board of administration to man-
age these "common elements" of the regime. A substantial
portion of the Virginia Act is devoted to regulatory and
"full disclosure" features, administered by and through the
Virginia Real Estate Commission with its inspections of the
regime and its reports pertaining thereto, all of which are
typical bureaucratic adjuncts of current public policy but
do not in any way contribute to the marketability of the title
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which an owner of a Virginia condominium unit receives by
his deed.
What is the meaning of "marketable title" to real property
in Virginia ? The test first applied was that of "such title as
a reasonably well informed .and intelligent purchaser, acting
upon business principles, would be willing to accept." Sachs
v. Owings, 121 Va. 162, 169, 92 S.E. 997, 999 (1917). This
"prudent purchaser" criteria gave way five years later to the
remedial "purchase money application" test of Davis v.
Buery, 134 Va. 322, 329, 114 S.D. 773, 777 (1922) which more
recently was supplanted by the "free from valid objection"
test, an evaluation that seems to be all-inclusive in its defini-
tion of a marketable title as a title "free from liens or en-
cumbrances and dependent for its validity on no doubtful
questions of law or fact." Cogito v. Dart, 183 Va. 882, 887,
33 S.E. 2d 759, 762 (1945). Applying this definitive pronounce-
ment of the late Chief Justice Hudgins to a title on a place
in space as established by the Virginia horizontal property
law, it seems clear in the light of earlier Virginia cases that
one or more doubtful questions of law or fact can and will
be raised within the context of the Horizontal Property Act.
A microscopic examination of ithe Act prompts the following
questions of both law and fact (with italics added for em-
phasis) :
(1) While § 55-79.14 seems to successfully apply the Home-
stead Exemption provisions of Title 34 to condominium
units, the closing sentence of this section provides that
real property taxes shall be assessed and collected "on
the individual apartments and not on the building as a
whole." 'hat about the assessment and collection of
real property taxes on the land upon which the horizontal
regime is -located?
(2) According to § 55-79.13 the expenses of the regime's
administration, also for the maintenance and repair of
the regime's common elements, as agreed upon by the
council of co-owners are to be shared pro rata by all
co-owners of the regime. Agreement by the council of
22 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES
co-owners would seem to require unanimous approval
pursuant to subsection (f) of § 55-79.2 since the pro rata
expense provision fails to use the term "majority of co-
owners" as defined in subsection (j) of the latter section.
The inability of four or more such co-owners to agree
unanimously, a likely probability, could defeat the allo-
cation, collection and payment of these expenses. With
such expenses outstanding against the regime, what
would then be the marketable status of the individual
titles? (Although this section eliminates any exemption
through waiver, non-use or total abandonment of a unit,
this added provision would seem to be moot in the
absence of a unanimous agreement by the council of co-
owners).
(3) The same section referred to in (2) above specifies that
"all co-owners are bound to contribute pro rata" to these
expenses. How are they bound by way of in personam
liability? It would seem that this section could only be
effective where each individual deed contained covenants
by which the condominium grantee bound himself, his
heirs, executors, administrators and -assigns to such con-
tributions, such covenants to be phrased in such a way
that they run with each horizontal property unit and are
made equally binding on both immediate and remote
grantees. Even with such covenants, the statute of limita-
tions could run on a breach thereof, which would seem to
contradict the unlimited binding clause of this section.
Moreover, the Act makes no provision for the inclusion
of such covenants (to contribute) in the individual deeds,
the only requirement as to content of said deeds being
(§ 55-79.8) that the description of the condominium land
and individual unit be specified therein, in addition to
encumbrances.
(4) Upon the sale or conveyance of a condominium unit, it
is provided in § 55-79.15 that unpaid pro rata assess-
ments for the regime's administration, and for the main-
tenance and repair of common elements, shall be first
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paid out of the purchase money, subject only to a priority
for taxes due and unpaid to governmental bodies and un-
satisfied liabilities to mortgagees under duly recorded
security instruments. However, where title to a horizontal
property unit passes by intestate succession, by devise,
or by right of survivorship, the Act is silent not only as
to the liability of such successors in title for the unpaid
assessments, but also makes no provision whatsoever for
the establishment of statutory liens on the individual
units to secure payment of these outstanding obligations.
(5) It is provided in § 55-79.11 that the entire administration
of the horizontal property regime shall be governed
according to by-laws approved and adopted by the council
of co-owners. In the light of the comments in (2) above,
any such approval or adoption of by-laws without a
unanimous vote of the co-owners would seem to be a
nullity and the administration of the entire regime would
be doomed from its inception. The failure of the legisla-
ture to provide for approval and adoption of the ad-
ministration by-laws by a majority of co-owners would
seem to be a fatal error either in legislative draftsman-
ship or intent.
(6) MWhere a single condominium unit or "apartment" is
used by its horizontal property owner as a combinati6n
residence and office, or for a combination of any of the
uses specified in subsection (a) of § 55-79.2, will that
combined use give rise to a cloud on title to the particular
unit, along with possible impairment of title to other
units in the project7 The absence of the phrase "or any
combination thereof" in this subsection may establish
statutory restrictions for single-purpose use of any unit
in the project, an objective perhaps not clearly intended
by the otherwise broad scope of this subsection.
(7) The Horizontal Property Act of Virginia, unlike the
recently enacted statutes of Arkansas and Kentucky,
makes no provision whatsoever for destruction by fire or
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other causes of the entire structure or any part of it,
makes no provision for the insurability of such potential
loss by the co-owners of their individual units as well as
their concurrent ownership interests in the common ele-
ments, makes no provision for the allocation of the
insurance proceeds in the event that insurance against
loss from such disasters is carried and a loss occurs,
and finally makes no provision at all for reconstruction
of all or a part of the structure with or without insurance
indemnity. When it is -considered that the structure itself
establishes the boundary lines of the property units, the
boundary lines of a freehold in space, this glaring empti-
ness of the Virginia Act portends almost certain valid
objections to a marketable title on a place in space.
As the ad coelum doctrine of antiquity -has slowly become
emaciated by the requirements of space navigation and the
necessities of space habitation, and as the ancient ad inferos
maxim has similarly been extinguished practically every-
where but in Virginia, thereby establishing the concept of
horizontal property ownership of a place in subsurface space,
the midpoint of the twentieth century as the nucleous of the
''space age" has brought to the American property law the
condominium, a concept of horizontal property ownership in
supersurface space, the latest approach to urban multiple
housing. Within this new context of horizontal property
ownership in space, there remains only the unsolved problem
built into the Horizontal Property Act of Virginia of estab-
lishing title to a place in space, a title to such horizontal
property free from valid objections and as such marketable
within the prevailing meaning of that term. The Virginia Act
seems to be urgently in need of some major revisions in
that direction. During his entire lifetime, Thomas A. Edison
lived by a motto that inspired his inventive genius and drove
him onward to the acquisition of more than a thousand
patents. The Edison philosophy might well serve as an in-
spiration to the legal profession of Virginia in the solution
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to the existing problem. "There is a better way to do it-
find it !" was the Edison proverb, and when a better way is
found to establish marketable title on a place in space, Vir-
ginia should be in the vanguard, leading the way toward
reform of its horizontal property law. Then, and only then,
will the urban dwellers of Virginia, comfortably housed in
their condominium apartments, be justified in propounding
a new clich&- 'a place in space, it's wonderful!"
